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CHAPTER 6
Conﬂicts have had a devastating impact on the economies of affected countries inSub-Saharan Africa (Yartey 2004, World Bank 2000a, Easterly and Levine 1999,Rodrick 1999). In Guinea-Bissau, conﬂicts and political instability have been the
main constraints for growth and poverty reduction over the past three decades. Rather
than being massive and pervasive, conﬂicts and instability in Guinea-Bissau have become
cyclical events conﬁned, to some extent, to the capital, but with economic and social con-
quences for the country as a whole. While the continued instability has not often caused
a signiﬁcant loss of human life and physical destruction (with the notable exception of the
1998 conflict, as discussed below), the instability has been detrimental to institution
building and has not produced an environment conducive to investment, growth, and
poverty reduction. As many as six major military-related incidents concerning political
power have taken place since independence in 1974. Thereafter, the country experienced
two decades of a state-controlled system before organizing its ﬁrst democratic elections 
in 1994. The ﬂedgling democratic process was halted by the 1998 civil conﬂict that led 
24. The authors are grateful to Humberto Lopez for help in estimating the impact of Guinea-Bissau’s
conﬂict on per capita GDP.
Conﬂict, Growth, and Poverty 
in Guinea-Bissau
Boubacar-Sid Barry and Quentin Wodon24
Conflicts and political instability have been serious constraints to growth in
Guinea-Bissau. Of special concern was the civil war of 1998, which lasted
11 months and led to substantial loss of life as well as to a massive decrease
in GDP per capita. Based on research on the economic cost of conflicts in
Sub-Saharan Africa conducted by Lopez and Wodon (2005) and using a
technique to identify outliers in time series and to correct the series for such
outliers, this chapter estimates that GDP per capita today could have been
more than 40 percent higher if there had been no conflict in 1998. In turn,
one in three persons living in poverty today might not be poor had it not
been for the conflict.
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to a drop in GDP per capita of roughly 30 percent, and to the displacement of up to 
350,000 people—or about one-ﬁfth of the population.
A state of persistent political instability prevailed after the war, and it was only in 2001
that new democratic elections brought a new civilian government to power. However, the
democratic process stalled again as the elected government failed to restore political stability
and good governance. Following several cabinet reshufﬂes, alleged coup attempts, and the
dissolution of the parliament during 2001–02, the military staged a bloodless coup d’état
in September 2003, and a civilian transition government was charged with restoring order
and rebuilding the public administration. Since mid-2004, the authorities have made sig-
niﬁcant progress in restoring ﬁscal discipline despite the highly polarized and still fragile
political environment.
The objective of this chapter is to measure the impact of the conﬂict on per capita GDP
in Guinea-Bissau. This was done using a technique developed by Tsay (1988, 1986) and
Gomez, Maravall, and Peña (1997) that identiﬁed and corrected outliers in time series. This
was then applied to the assessment of the impact of conﬂicts on GDP per capita in Sub-
Saharan African countries by Lopez and Wodon (2005).25 The estimates suggest that GDP
per capita would be roughly 42 to 43 percent higher today if the conﬂict had not occurred.
In turn, assuming that the conﬂict had no impact on inequality (we don’t have data on that
potential impact), we found that about one-third of people now in poverty can be said to
be poor because of the conﬂict.
The chapter is organized as follows: the ﬁrst section brieﬂy reviews the political context
and recent economic performance of the country, including a discussion of the various
impacts of the conﬂict; and the second section provides econometric estimates of the loss in
per capita GDP attributed to the conﬂict and the likely impact that this economic loss has
had, in turn, on poverty. A brief conclusion follows.
Guinea-Bissau’s Conﬂict and Economic Performance: A Brief Review
Political Context
Guinea-Bissau has experienced a long history of conﬂict and political instability. Following
a decade-long freedom war with Portugal, Guinea-Bissau became independent in 1974. As
noted in Chapter 1, the government of Luis Cabral was overthrown in a bloodless coup led
by the prime minister and former armed forces commander, João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira,
in 1980. There were several coup attempts against the Vieira government in 1983, 1985, and
1993. In 1994, the country’s ﬁrst multiparty legislative and presidential elections were held.
President Vieira, of the ruling Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape-Verde
(PAIGC), was re-elected with a slight margin over Kumba Yala of the Party of Social
Restoration (PRS). An army uprising against the Vieira government in June 1998 triggered
a bloody civil war that displaced over 300,000 members of the civilian population. Failed
25. Lopez and Wodon (2005) noted that this approach differs from that used by Murdoch and Sandler
(2001) who used cross-country panel data to measure the average effect of conflicts on growth. The
main issue with cross-country results is that indices of war tend to be discrete variables with low cross-
country variability. As a result, the averaging involved in estimating the impact of conﬂicts may under- or
overestimate impacts where conﬂicts are particularly severe or instead relatively mild, respectively.
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governance, breakdown of the rule of law, and limited accountability and transparency of
public sector management were among the causes of this conﬂict, which lasted nearly a year.
Following the conﬂict, attention was turned to the task of reconciliation and rehabil-
itation. By June 1999, the situation, although still fragile, calmed down and improved
steadily. A Government of National Union (GNU) was put in place and charged with the
tasks of preparing a National Reconciliation and Rehabilitation Program (NRRP) and orga-
nizing elections. Free and fair parliamentary elections were held on November 28, 1999, and
a presidential runoff vote took place on January 16, 2000. Opposition parties scored a
landslide victory in both elections. President-elect Kumba Yala of the PRS took ofﬁce on
February 17, 2000. Shortly after, a broad coalition cabinet, including members of various
parties in the national assembly, was appointed.
The task of national reconciliation and reconstruction was, however, undermined by
the lack of political consensus. Following the elections, the parliament approved a new con-
stitution in April 2001, which was neither vetoed nor promulgated by the president. The
resulting ambiguity undermined the rule of law, and a prolonged friction developed
between the executive and the legislative branches of the government over the choice of the
new cabinet chief. As a result, the country operated without an effective government for
several weeks, and the announcement of yet another foiled coup attempt in mid-April 2001
demonstrated once again the fragility of the political and democratic processes. The pre-
vailing political instability, which affected all institutions, was not conducive to economic
recovery and postconﬂict reconstruction. In December 2001, the government allegedly
thwarted a coup attempt by army ofﬁcers.
Delays in holding parliamentary elections led to a military coup and the appointment
of a transition government in September 2003. Between December 2001 and December
2002, President Yala carried out two cabinet reshuffles, dissolved the parliament, and
called for legislative elections, which were repeatedly postponed. The ensuing discontent
among the population led the army to seize power in a bloodless coup in September 2003.
President Yala announced his resignation and was placed under house arrest. The mili-
tary, led by the chief of defense, Gen. Verrisimo Seabra (who was later killed along with
other ofﬁcers during the October 6, 2004 mutiny), quickly restored power to civilian con-
trol, and a civilian caretaker government was appointed with the objective of restoring the
rule of law and reasserting control over public ﬁnances. In this context, the businessman
Henrique Rosa was sworn in as interim president, with the support of almost all political
parties as well as that of the civil society. By the end of 2003, the newly appointed gov-
ernment prepared an Emergency Economic Management Plan (EEMP) and a budget for
2004 with the support of the international community.
Parliamentary elections were successfully organized in early 2004, and the postelection
government endorsed the EEMP reform agenda. Legislative elections were held in March
2004 and an orderly transition to a government elected on the basis of a broad reform plat-
form took place in May 2004. The transition government, led by the leader of the PAIGC,
Carlos Gomes Júnior was appointed with the objective of ensuring the functioning of the
public administration and preparing presidential elections by mid-2005. Despite the dif-
ficult economic situation, the government prepared a draft of the country’s PRSP and
signiﬁcantly improved budgetary discipline during the second half of 2004. The govern-
ment also endorsed the reform program, which was agreed to by the international com-
munity; prepared the 2005 budget; and successfully organized a free, fair, and transparent
presidential election that was won by the independent candidate and former president,
João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira.
Recurrent military interventions on the political scene, as experienced in the recent past,
still remain a major obstacle to stability and democracy. So far, the military has kept their
promise not to intervene in the political process during and after the presidential elections.
However, the widespread poverty in the barracks and the highly polarized political envi-
ronment remain ingredients for future interventions of the military. Moreover, the major-
ity of soldiers in Guinea-Bissau’s army are from the Balante ethnic group. There is a critical
need for reforming the security sector to prevent further instability and conﬂict.
Consequences of the 1998 Conﬂict
The human losses and economic disruption created by the 11-month conﬂict that took place
in 1998 were widespread. Between 2,000 and 6,000 lives were lost and up to 350,000 persons
were internally displaced, including 7,000 who were generally better educated and sought
refuge in Senegal, Cape Verde, the Gambia, Guinea, and Portugal, thereby depleting Guinea-
Bissau’s limited human capital. While solidarity within the population helped to avoid a
major humanitarian crisis, deprivation increased dramatically and food stocks were depleted
(on vulnerability in Guinea-Bissau, see for example Lourenço-Lindell, 2002, and World Bank
2000b and 2006).
Real GDP declined by 28 percent because of a sharp decline of production in all sectors.
A signiﬁcant deceleration in the production of cashew nuts and cereals probably helped
cause a 17 percent decline in agriculture production. Most of the formal industrial, trade,
and service activities were interrupted in the last seven months of 1998. The closing of banks
and nonpayment of most wages repressed the impact of the war on prices. However, the
armed conﬂict adversely affected the country’s ﬁscal position and its balance of payments.
Marketing of cashew nuts, the main source of public revenue, was severely disrupted and
merchandise exports and imports (in U.S. dollars) decreased by about 45 and 30 percent,
respectively, over the period 1997–98. As a result, the external current account deﬁcit
(excluding ofﬁcial transfers) remained at a high of nearly 16 percent of the GDP, and the
current primary budget balance moved from a surplus of about 5 percent of the GDP in
1997 to a deﬁcit of about 7 percent of the GDP in 1998. After June 1998, external debt ser-
vice arrears piled up that were equivalent to almost 10 percent of the GDP. Arrears on
salaries, goods and services, pensions, and transfers also represented 5 percent of the GDP.
Apart from a reduction in income ﬂows as represented by the GDP, capital destruction
was also widespread. Damages to public infrastructure (including the airport, energy and
water systems, health and education facilities, roads, markets, public enterprises, and admin-
istrative buildings) amounted to $25–$30 million. Some 5,000 houses were damaged in the
capital city of Bissau, and losses of up to $90 million were incurred by businesses because of
destruction, requisition, conﬁscation, and looting. As the private sector was hit, the bank-
ing system was also weakened from an already fragile position. Investor conﬁdence faded,
leading to a reduction in investments (both foreign and domestic). Furthermore, the imple-
mentation of necessary reforms in the areas of taxation, civil service, public enterprises,
and the social sectors were interrupted as the administration could not implement the
1998–2001 Policy Framework Paper that had been agreed upon in May 1998, and the con-
ﬂict led to a temporary halt in donor funding.
114 World Bank Working Paper
Growth and Poverty Reduction 115
Postconﬂict Economic Performance
The economy bounced back during 1999–2000 because of a return to peace and good
agricultural performance. During the two years following the conﬂict, economic perfor-
mance improved as a result of the enhanced security situation and gradual resettlement
of displaced populations. Nearly all of the 300,000 to 350,000 persons initially displaced
by the conflict in 1998 returned to their homes. Agricultural production, which repre-
sents nearly 60 percent of the GDP, grew on average by 6 percent in real term per annum
during the period 1999–2000. Cashew nut production, the leading agricultural subsector,
averaged 70,000 metric tons over the indicated period (compared to 50,000 metric tons
in 1997). Performance in agriculture had positive spillover effects on the economy as a
whole (as evidenced by the close correlation between trends of real GDP growth and
cashew nut production). Services grew on average by 15 percent in real terms, largely
because of the close interrelationship between transportation activities and the boom in
the cashew sector. Industrial activities suffered from heavy damage in infrastructure and
electricity supply. Industrial growth ﬁrst decelerated by 1 percent in 1999 and then picked
up by 10 percent in the following year, thanks to donor support to the government’s
reconstruction program.
Real annual GDP grew by an average of nearly 8 percent from 1999 to 2000, leading to
a growth in per capita GDP of close to 10 percent over two years. At the same time, gov-
ernment revenue reached 18 percent of the GDP, and the overall budget deﬁcit (excluding
grants) increased from 14 percent to 25 percent of the GDP as a result of increased post-
conﬂict reconstruction activities. Late in 1999, the government and the International Mon-
etary Fund agreed upon a macroeconomic framework for the period 2000–01 that would
consolidate and sustain economic performance, reduce inﬂation, and limit ﬁscal and exter-
nal gaps to ﬁnancially sustainable levels. Progress continued to be encouraging on the
macroeconomic front through December 2000, and the country completed its interim
PRSP, reached the decision point under the HIPC Initiative, and agreed to a three-year
PRGF program with the IMF for the period 2001–03.
However, inadequate public policies prevented the conclusion of the IMF’s ﬁrst PRGF
review in 2001, resulting in payment difﬁculties. Early in 2001, the macroeconomic pro-
gram was found to be substantially off track owing to large unbudgeted expenditures mainly
on defense that were ﬁnanced by credit from the banking system and promissory notes. Late
in 2001 a string of political crises at the northern border with Senegal in the Casamance
region added to the worsening security situation. Military crackdowns ordered by the
authorities led to a signiﬁcant expenditure overrun, and the primary ﬁscal deﬁcit reached
3.7 percent of the GDP in 2001 compared with the targeted surplus of 0.8 percent under the
PRGF program. Consequently, the ﬁrst review of the PRGF by the IMF was not concluded
as scheduled in 2001, and the program was declared off track. After two unsuccessful short-
term, staff-monitored programs, efforts to revive the program were abandoned by mid-
2002, and the arrangement expired at the end of 2003 without the completion of a review.
In view of the disappointing developments, the IMF established that it would be unlikely
that Guinea-Bissau would be able to meet PRGF standards in the near future.
Under these conditions, donor support (equivalent to 4 percent of the GDP) did not
materialize as expected, causing severe payment difﬁculties. External budgetary supports
decreased from $12 million in 2000 to $1 million in 2001. The balance of payment and
ﬁscal difﬁculties were further fueled by a record 37 percent decline in world market prices
of cashew nuts in 2001. Consequently, export volume growth plummeted from 26 per-
cent to −1 percent between 1999 and 2002, and government budgetary revenues as a share
of GDP decreased from 19 percent to 15 percent during the same period. In this context,
the external account and budget deﬁcits (excluding external grants) reached 13 percent
and 26 percent of the GDP, respectively, by the end of 2001.
The economy became recessionary in 2001 and further stagnated through 2002–03.
Real GDP grew at a minor rate of 0.2 percent by the end of 2001, and contracted by 7.2 per-
cent by the end of 2002. The main contributing factors to the economic contraction in 2002
were the 15 percent fall of the production of cashew nuts, a lower than expected agricul-
tural performance due to unfavorable weather conditions, and the continued suspension
of donor-funded policy lending representing about 7 percent of the GDP. The ﬁscal situ-
ation continued to be precarious because of the sharp decline in economic activity and the
implementation of a number of policy decisions outside the emergency ﬁnancial manage-
ment framework that was agreed upon with the IMF and the Bank.
Economic performance remained sluggish in 2003. Although the agriculture sector
grew by about 5 percent, real GDP grew by only 0.6 percent because of a signiﬁcant con-
traction in the other sectors of the economy. Simultaneously, ﬁscal management further
deteriorated when a substantial diversion of resources to expenditures took place outside
the legally established budgetary procedures. A key issue in public ﬁnance management
was the decision by President Yala to increase the salaries of the military in 2003 by more
than tenfold. Consequently, the public sector wage bill increased from 8 percent of GDP
in 2003 to about 11 percent in 2004.26
Thanks to an enhanced ﬁscal management and increased donor support to the EEMP,
economic performance started to recover in 2004. During the second half of 2004, the tran-
sition government formed after the September 2003 military coup took decisive measures
aimed at restoring fiscal discipline. The treasury committee, established in 2003, was
reinstated and tasked with implementing a strict cashﬂow management system. As a result,
budgetary revenues increased from 15.5 percent in 2003 to 17.5 percent by the end of 2004.
It is worth noting that this performance was largely attributed to improved tax collection
in the informal sector and illegal ﬁshing activities. The government, however, continued
to rely on external assistance for the implementation of the EEMP in 2004. The economy
started to recover in 2004 with real GDP growth reaching 2.2 percent by the end of 2004.
While growth was not expected to change substantially in 2005 because of capacity con-
straints and continued political uncertainties, performance was expected to improve in the
medium term if adequate ﬁscal and capacity building reforms were carried out (for a recent
review of developments in Guinea-Bissau, see Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005).
Impact of the Conﬂict on GDP Per Capita and Poverty
Impact of the Conﬂict on Per Capita GDP
This section assesses the impact of the conﬂict on per capita GDP using a procedure pro-
posed by Tsay (1988, 1986) for detecting outliers in time series. The basic idea is to empir-
ically test and correct the data for the presence of outliers in the GDP per capita time series.
26. Most public sector wages remained unpaid in the ﬁrst nine months of 2003 prior to the military coup.
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If the outliers are observed at the time of conﬂicts (for example, the year 1998 for Guinea-
Bissau), then the corrected series for GDP per capita can be assumed to represent the counter-
factual path that the economy would have followed if there had been no conﬂict. Details
on the estimation methodology are provided in Lopez and Wodon (2005) who conducted
similar work on Rwanda. Here we provide the basic estimation strategy and the key empir-
ical results. The results for Guinea-Bissau are compared to a broader set of results for
Sub-Saharan countries that had a recent conflict.
The variable e(t) can be understood as a white noise sequence with a zero mean and
constant variance σ2. L is the lag operator (i.e., Le(t) = e(t−1)), and ϕ (L) is a polynomial
in L with Σ j⎟ ϕj⎟ <∝ and roots of ϕ(z) = 0 outside the unit circle. GDP per capita, denoted
by Y(t), is represented through a univariate time series with:
In the above, X(t) is a stationary and invertible series for which the polynomial ϕ(L) can
be approximated by ϕ(L) = θ(L)/φ(L), with θ(L) and φ(L) ﬁnite order polynomials in L
(that is, X(t) would follow an ARMA process). Z(t) is deﬁned so that o(t) = 1 at t = s, if at
time s an outlier occurs and o(t) = 0 otherwise. The structure of w(L) deﬁnes various poten-
tial types of outliers, which are represented visually in Figure 6.1. If w(L) = ω, Z(t) deﬁnes
an additive outlier (AO), which accounts for a “one shot” change in GDP in a given year.
If w(L) = ω/(1−L), we obtain a level shift (LS), which implies a permanent impact on the
series. Finally, if w(L) = ω/(1−δL), the estimation suggests a transitory change (TC), which
vanishes over time. The empirical strategy to estimate these equations is discussed in Lopez
and Wodon (2005). The method can be generalized to control for additional variables that
may affect the GDP per capita, which is done here to consider the potential impact of
changes in terms of trade.
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The procedure applied to Guinea-Bissau using the data on GDP per capita in constant
local currency units as well as data on the changes in the terms of trade reveals the existence
of a single additive (“one shot”) outlier for the year 1998, which corresponds to the civil war.
The estimates provided here are from comparative data for Guinea-Bissau and various other
Sub-Saharan African countries that a conﬂict.
According to Table 6.1, GDP per capita would have been 42 or 43 percent higher in
2004 (depending on the model) than it actually was if there had been no conflict, which
is a very large impact (also see Figure 6.2). As a point of comparison, in Rwanda, where
the human, social, and economic costs of the genocide have been staggering, the esti-
mates suggest that the per capita GDP would be between 25 and 30 percent higher today
than if the genocide had not taken place (Lopez and Wodon 2005), which suggests a
smaller economic impact than in Guinea-Bissau. Much of the difference between the
impacts observed in Guinea-Bissau and Rwanda stems from the fact that two outliers
were identified in Rwanda. First, in 1994, the year of the genocide, there was a loss of
about 40 percent of the GDP. In the following year, however, there was a rebound
(another additive, but this time a positive outlier) so that part of the negative impact of
GDP Per GDP per capita 
GDP capita Index, index, controlling 
per capita controlling for the conﬂict 
Year index for the conﬂict and terms of trade
1970* 100.0 100.0 100.0
1980* 80.9 80.9 80.9
1990 102.6 102.6 102.6
1991 104.1 104.1 104.1
1992 101.8 101.8 101.8
1993 100.9 100.9 100.9
1994 101.0 101.0 101.0
1995 102.4 102.4 102.4
1996 111.0 111.0 111.0
1997 115.1 115.1 115.1
1998 80.6 114.7 115.2
1999 84.5 120.3 120.8
2000 88.3 125.7 126.2
2001 86.0 122.4 122.9
2002 77.6 110.4 110.9
2003 75.8 108.0 108.4
2004 76.8 109.3 109.8
GDP cost (%) in 2002 — −42.3 −42.9
Table 6.1 Impact of the Conﬂict on Per Capita GDP
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Note: The value of 42.4 percent is obtained as (109.3/76.8) − 1. While estimates are only provided
for 1970 and 1980, the actual estimations were done using annual GDP data from before 1990.
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the conflict was offset. Such a rebound was not observed in Guinea-Bissau, leading to a
larger economic impact of the conflict even though the loss in human life was substan-
tially less severe.
It is also important to note that losses in GDP were observed in Guinea-Bissau as in
Rwanda, but the conﬂicts did not seem to have a negative impact on the growth rate of
GDP per capita. These results could be interpreted as an indication that these conﬂicts gen-
erated a reduction in the stock values of key economic variables, such as human and phys-
ical capital, without changing the returns on these stocks.
Impact of the Conﬂict on Poverty
Once we have estimated what level of GDP per capita would have been achieved without
the conﬂict, it is straightforward to estimate what the poverty level would have been with-
out the conﬂict, provided we are willing to make a number of (rather strong) assumptions.
In the absence of good information on the distributional consequences of a conﬂict (that
is, who gets affected most and why), these assumptions are necessary to translate our esti-
mate of the impact of the conﬂict on GDP per capita into an estimate of how consumption
per equivalent adult may have changed as measured in household surveys. To explain these
assumptions, it is useful to brieﬂy review how poverty was estimated in Guinea-Bissau
within the framework of the Poverty Reduction Strategy prepared by authorities.
The ofﬁcial estimates of poverty for Guinea-Bissau are based on a somewhat ad hoc
methodology, in part because of weaknesses in the scope of the data collected in the house-
hold survey used to measure poverty. The only available nationally-representative survey
is the 2002 ILAP, a light household survey that was implemented following the core wel-
fare indicator survey (CWIQ) methodology. The survey includes a consumption module,
but this module is not very detailed, making it difﬁcult to properly estimate poverty lines
based on traditional approaches, such as the cost of basic needs framework. Instead, the
authorities adopted an extreme poverty line of $1 per person per day after adjusting for
Figure 6.2 Impact of the 1998 Conﬂict on Per Capita GDP
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purchasing power parity (Sylla 2004). This resulted in a unique extreme poverty line for
the country as a whole (without adjusting for differences in the cost of living between urban
and rural areas, for example) of CFAF 108,000 per person per year. A second poverty line
of CFAF 216,000 per person per year was obtained, which corresponded to $2 per person
per day. An estimate of the consumption of households per equivalent adult was then
derived from the survey data to identify those in poverty and compute a range of poverty
and extreme poverty measures.
The results from our GDP per capita simulations for poverty measurement assumes
that the GDP per capita growth, as measured in the national accounts, is essentially per-
fectly correlated with the average growth in the consumption per adult equivalent at the
household level. That is, we will use our estimates of the impact of the conﬂict on per capita
GDP as our best guess for the impact of the conﬂict on the mean adult equivalent per
household consumption. A second assumption is that we can rely on the poverty lines used
for measuring poverty in the 2002 household survey to assess the impact of the conﬂict.
We do not change the poverty lines for our counterfactual poverty measures without the
conﬂict because we assume that the conﬂict did not affect relative prices and consumption
patterns in such a way that other poverty lines would have had to be used in the absence of
conﬂict. A third assumption is that inequality in per adult equivalent consumption was not
affected by the conflict, so that we only need to incorporate the impact of the conflict on
mean consumption for our poverty simulations. We only have one survey in Guinea-
Bissau that does not have comparable preconﬂict household level data, so we simply can-
not assess the impact of the conﬂict on inequality. It is best to assume that the inequality
has remained unchanged.
If we accept these assumptions, the procedure for assessing the impact of the conﬂict
on poverty is very simple. We ﬁrst compute poverty using the 2002 household survey data,
and then we compute our counterfactual poverty measures after scaling up the adult equiv-
alent consumption aggregate for all households in the survey by a factor equal to the ratio
of the estimated per capita GDP without the conﬂict to the observed per capita GDP at the
time of the survey.
The poverty measures used here are the standard ﬁrst three poverty measures of the
so-called FGT class (Foster and others, 1984), namely the head count, the poverty gap, and
the squared poverty gap. Denoting the poverty line by z, the number of households (pop-
ulation weighted) by n, the number of poor households by q, and the adult equivalent con-
sumption aggregate of household k by ck, then the three measures are deﬁned, taking a
value of zero for the head count, one for the poverty gap, and two for the squared poverty
gap in the following expression:
Today, as shown in Table 6.2 and following the methodology used in the PRSP for poverty
measurement, we ﬁnd that 65.7 percent of the population is poor; that is, with a level of
consumption per equivalent adult below the $2 poverty line in purchasing power parity
terms, with 21.6 percent being the extreme poor. If the conﬂict had not taken place, so that
per capita GDP today would be 42.3 percent higher than actually observed (the results
would be very similar after correcting for terms of trade, hence are not provided here),
P
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poverty would be much lower. Table 6.2 suggests that the share of the population in
poverty today could be around 43.0 percent instead of 65.7 percent, while the share of
the population in extreme poverty could be at 7.6 percent instead of 21.6 percent. Note
that the percentage reduction in poverty following the 42.3 percent reduction in GDP per
capita suggests that the elasticity of poverty reduction to growth is roughly around one (it
is lower for some poverty measures, and higher for others), which is a reasonable estimate
according to international experience.
As expected, the corresponding elasticities for the extreme poverty measures are larger,
(these elasticities are a function of the poverty lines—the higher the poverty line, the lower
the elasticity). Overall, one in three persons is in poverty today in Guinea-Bissau because
of the conﬂict, with an even higher share for extreme poverty measures.
Conclusion
This paper has estimated the economic cost of the 1998 Guinea-Bissau conﬂict on poverty.
Following previous work by Lopez and Wodon (2005), a methodology for the identiﬁca-
tion and correction of outliers in time series was used to estimate the counterfactual GDP
per capita that would have been observed in 2002 if the conﬂict had not taken place. The
results suggest that the per capita GDP could have been between 42 to 43 percent higher
in 2002 than it was without the conﬂict, assuming that the trend in GDP as available in
national accounts statistics adequately represents changes in economic activity. Next, rely-
ing on a number of (admittedly) strong assumptions, we estimated the counterfactual
poverty measures that would have prevailed in the absence of the conﬂict. Our estimates
suggest that one in three persons today in poverty might not have been poor if the conﬂict
had not taken place, and the proportion is even higher for extreme poverty. While all these
results could be sensitive to some of our assumption, they do provide an idea of the large
impact that the conﬂict has had on poverty in Guinea-Bissau.
Poverty Poverty Poverty reduction, 
observed without the Poverty reduction percentage versus 
in 2002 survey conﬂict in percentage points baseline 
(1) (2) (2)−(1) [(2)−(1)]/(1)
Poverty
Head count index 65.7 43.0 −22.7 −34.6%
Poverty gap 25.7 13.2 −12.5 −48.6%
Squared poverty gap 12.9 5.7 −7.2 −55.8%
Extreme poverty
Head count index 21.6 7.6 −14.0 −64.8%
Poverty gap 5.5 1.8 −3.7 −67.3%
Squared poverty gap 2.2 0.7 −1.5 −68.2%
Table 6.2 Impact of the 1998 Conﬂict on Poverty
Source: Authors’ estimates using 2002 ILAP.
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